













Democracy Lost The War:  





An Undergraduate Thesis for the  
Honors B.A. Degree in Classical Civilizations 











 “I am the combined efforts of everyone I’ve ever known,”1 and I have been fortunate 
enough to know some truly wonderful people.  
I owe a sincere thanks to all of my friends who, for the past year, have allowed me to turn 
most conversations into a discussion on the inherent failures of Democracy.  They are, 
thankfully, still willing to call me friend.  
Additionally I’d like to thank Professor Donald Sells for being a patient and thorough 
second reader. Thank you for reminding me that there is room for humor in any good argument.  
 But this thesis would truly be nowhere without my advisor Sara Forsdyke. Thank you for 
patiently letting this paper go through countless metamorphoses, and thank you for your 
unwavering encouragement of my argument. You helped me do something I never thought I 
could. This experience was rewarding, enlightening, and infinitely more fun than writing an 
honors thesis has any right to be, and for that I thank you.  
 I must also thank my honors advisor Netta Berlin, who suggested I write a thesis my 
sophomore year, so I did. From the terrified freshman that transferred into your Latin 231 class, 
thank you for always believing in me.  
Finally, I must thank my mom. For encouraging me, for arguing with me, and for never 
letting a family vacation go by without a trip to at least one museum. Thank you giving me a 
love of stories, especially the ones that tell us there’s some good in this world, and it’s worth 
fighting for.   
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Chuck	  Palahaniuk,	  Invisible	  Monsters,	  1999.	  	  
Lemisch	  3	  
Abstract  
 Contrary to the belief that the Athenians were manipulated into losing the war by 
nefarious or incapable leaders, this thesis will argue that the fault for Athenian defeat was the 
demos itself. The demos’ intractable emotion, the format of the Assembly, but most importantly 
the demos’ unwillingness to admit its own role within the political relationship of democracy 
lead to the Athenian’s eventual loss. These are all inherent components of democracy, and in that 
way Thucydides’ text could be viewed as a condemnation of democracy in general. But perhaps, 
as this paper will argue, Thucydides’ text serves more as a warning for future democracies 
against their own nature. This view stands in light of Thucydides’ depiction of Pericles, who 
represents the ideal political relationship between demos and strategos, suggesting that 
democracy can in fact work under the proper conditions of honest leadership and accountable 
citizenry. It must be noted that Thucydides wrote not simply a history, but a didactic narrative 
which can be read often through his editing of speeches, but also in his own authorial voice 
throughout the text. This History is an argument, it calls to attention the demos’ influence 
alongside its lack of responsibility, resulting in poor judgment that failed Athens in the field. 
This paper will analyze Pericles, the Mytilenian debate, and the Sicilian expedition, in order to 
reveal the people’s unwillingness to be culpable, Thucydides’ condemnation of that refusal, and 
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Chapter 1: Pericles 
“It Is You Who Change” 
 Democracy is the rule of the citizens, yet throughout much of the discourse on Athenian 
democracy during the Peloponnesian War, the blame for its defeat goes to the leaders. Indeed, 
Athenian citizens renounced responsibility for ill fated decisions, as Thucydides describes in his 
History. Strategos and orators, even oracles are suggested to be the cause of Athens’ defeat, 
omitting the democratic elections and processes that lead to those ill fated decisions. However, 
this chapter will argue that Thucydides rejects that notion, and rests the onus of defeat on the 
demos itself. His depiction of Pericles as the most adept leader the Athenians ever had lends 
itself to this argument, because even he was subject to the decisions of the people. Pericles was, 
as Thucydides writes, skilled at persuading the demos to the right conclusions, but even he had to 
govern within the confines of democratic elections. This chapter will further explore the concept 
that Athenian democracy was a direct democracy. That is to say, all citizens were able to vote, 
this right was exercised, and those votes had political impact. If this is the case, and the tangible 
power in Athens rested with the demos, then why would the demos not be held accountable for 
its loss? An answer, one that this chapter will oppose, can be found in Pericles, who, as 
Strategos, was able to successfully lead the people. However, Pericles, as Thucydides writes 
him, was still at the mercy of the people. Thucydides depicts Pericles, the greatest of men, as 
beholden to the Athenian public, thus portraying the power and culpability of the demos.  
 Pericles, though known as a great leader, could not operate outside the demos and 
Athenian law. As Vincent Azoulay reveals, “every one of [Pericles’] projects was submitted to a 
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vote of the Assembly that also decided how to finance it.”2 Even Pericles, “the first man of his 
time,”3 was beholden to the democratic regime. It is worth noting that Pericles was a highly 
persuasive orator, but this cannot negate the demos’ role in Athenian politics. In requiring the 
consent of the demos, it cannot be argued that Pericles was an absolute ruler of Athens. Azoulay 
continues that “every decision was the subject of negotiation between the orator and the 
people,”4 and that there was always the possibility of the Athenians to change their minds. 
Pericles was a statesmen and an orator, and though he was undeniably skilled, his ability to 
aggregate votes did not afford him autonomy. His political and military endeavors were still 
controlled by democratic approval. Even if this approval was nearly guaranteed, the very fact 
that Pericles had to present before the Assembly is a testament to the influence of the demos. 
Moreover, there were times when the demos exerted power over Pericles. In 430 BCE Pericles 
was “deposed, he was judged and sentenced to pay a very large fine”5 to the state. He was not 
above the demos, rather, he served the demos. 
 Thucydides specifically depicts Pericles in this self sacrificing manner perhaps to reveal 
the ideal democracy. Pericles represents the most successful relationship between demos and 
strategos throughout the History of the Peloponnesian War. This is evident in that Pericles was 
able to rally support even in the face of death, as seen in the funeral oration, and he is able to 
“lead”6 the Athenians without succumbing to populist pacification. In Thucydides’ description, 
Pericles cares deeply for the demos, but will not pander to its desires, nor cow to its demands. 
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University	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  trans.	  by	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(New	  York:	  Barnes	  and	  Noble	  Classics,	  2006),	  1.139.	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  Pericles	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  148.	  
6	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  History,	  2.65.	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This depiction is perhaps a rhetorical device by Thucydides, considering the fact that other 
historians do not offer an equally noble portrait of Pericles. Azoulay argues that Thucydides 
wrote within “a tradition hostile to Pericles,”7 with other historians depicting him as tyrannical 
and self serving.  Conversely, Thucydides offers a positive view of Pericles, who was unmatched 
in “ability and known integrity.”8 Thucydides further extols Pericles in that he “never sought 
power by improper means,”9 depicting the very antithesis of a tyrant. This poses a question into 
Thucydides’ portrait of Pericles. As Azoulay describes, Pericles was heavily scrutinized by the 
people of his own time. Indeed, the Athenians themselves turned on Pericles, fearing him a 
tyrant, and this enmity “did not subside until he had been fined.”10 Why then would Thucydides 
go to such lengths to depict Pericles as the best of men, as the pinnacle of Athenian citizenship.  
 Victoria Wohl suggests in her Love Among the Ruins that Thucydides is transposing 
himself on Pericles, specifically in the funeral oration. Both were generals, and both experienced 
the anger of the demos. But more than this, Wohl argues that during the funeral oration 
“Thucydides’ voice and Pericles’ are effectively inseparable.”11 The funeral oration in essence 
describes the ideal Athenian democracy, one in which equality rules and citizens do their duty to 
the state. As Wohl summarizes, it describes “the Athenians not as they were, but as they wanted 
to be or to imagine they were.”12 This imagined state is the lofty ideal Thucydides spends the rest 
of the text undermining. From the passionate prose of Pericles will befall a plague, civic 
rebellion, and the failed Sicilian expedition, but it is important that Thucydides starts here, with 
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  Thucydides,	  History,	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10	  Thucydides,	  History,	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  Erotics	  of	  Democracy	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  Classical	  Athens,	  (New	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  Princeton	  University	  Press	  2009),	  31.	  
12	  Wohl,	  Love	  Among	  the	  Ruins	  33	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the ideal. Wohl suggests that then Pericles, in the History, is an emblem, a representative of the 
ideal state of Athens. She suggests that Pericles is the manifestation of the funeral oration he 
delivers. This could explain the disconnect between the historical Pericles Azoulay describes and 
Thucydides’ idealistic strategos. Azoulay reveals that Pericles undeniably took part in the 
expansion of the Athenian empire, which he himself warns the Athenians against on his death. 
Furthermore, Pericles was known for ruthlessly crushing the revolts of allied cities,13 perhaps 
undermining the reasonable depiction Thucydides affords him. But more than this, Azoulay 
suggests that Pericles was not worthy of the esteem Thucydides affords him in that he “was no 
better and no worse than anyone else and was by no means original.”14 Pericles was a strategos, 
as were many. Many people, some of whom Thucydides depicts in his History, used passionate 
prose to persuade the masses. Many leaders, such as Nicias in the Sicilian expedition, had the 
best interests of Athens at heart, and were selfless in their quest of Athenian victory. Perhaps 
then, it is important to understand Pericles, as Thucydides writes him, to understand the lesson of 
the History. If historically Pericles was simply one of many leaders who governed well and could 
speak with clarity, then why does Thucydides give his voice so much power in the text? Perhaps 
as Wohl describes, Thucydides is using Pericles to exemplify the ideal democracy.  
 Thucydides is, at least, the editor of the funeral oration, and it is therefore a considerable 
argument that his personal beliefs run throughout it. Pericles then becomes a vessel to convey 
Thucydides’ message, and in looking at the funeral oration, one could argue that the message is 
that of civic responsibility. The funeral oration celebrates and mourns the men of Athens who 
completed the highest civic duty: dying for Athens. It begins by extolling the ancestors who grew 
Athens into an empire, and also incidentally died for it. The funeral oration ends by requesting 
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  61.	  
Lemisch	  9	  
Athenians to bear more citizens, so that they too may die for it. Pericles asks of the people before 
him, “still of an age to beget children must bear up in the hope of having others in their stead.”15 
This may seem an insensitive request in the face of lost loved ones, but it perhaps reflects a 
deeper truth of Athenian democracy. The truth that a democracy cannot exist without the willing 
demos. All political regimes require subjects, but democracies differ in that their citizens have 
freedom to choose. Citizens, to a degree, could choose whether or not they want to die for their 
nation, and to that end, Athens needs willing citizens. Pericles reveals the dire need for citizens 
in that they are both “a reinforcement and a security”16 that Athens cannot exist without. Athens 
needs citizens to fight and die for her, and in that way, she is beholden to the demos.  
Perhaps, then, Pericles reveals a fundamental component in Athenian democracy that can 
be found throughout the History, the incredible power of the citizens. As Thucydides reveals, 
there is perhaps a difference to democracy as oppose to other regimes. In democracy, as opposed 
to a monarchy, the people must willingly give themselves up for Athens. Rather than sending 
men off to war to fight for a demagogue or king, a democracy sends its citizens to fight for 
themselves. Pericles, and all of Athens, remains at the discretion of the demos. Pericles cannot 
govern without their consent, nor can Athens exist without it. Citizens, the funeral oration 
reveals, must be willing to give entirely to Athens in order for her to survive. Pericles uses 
passionate language to describe this sentiment, possibly revealing the urgency of his speech. He 
says, “you must yourselves realize the power of Athens, and feed your eyes upon her from day to 
day, till love of her fills your hearts.”17 It is a vital demand he articulates, that the people must 
realize the power of Athens. Perhaps, in this speech, the power of Athens is the people 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Thucydides,	  History,	  2.44.	  
16	  Thucydides,	  History,	  2.44	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themselves. They must fall in love with Athens, they must procreate for Athens, they must die 
for Athens, because if they do not, Athens will perish. The people hold the vital role in this 
relationship, because Pericles does describe this as a relationship. He reveals that the men who 
die for Athens, “their children will be brought up till manhood at the public expense.”18 This 
reveals that Athens is indebted to those who die for her. Dying for Athens is therefore not a 
command, not the will of a demagogue, but the vital piece of a tenacious relationship. Athens is 
not a tyrant to its own people, for it owes them something for their troubles. In promising to take 
care of those left behind, Athens reveals the symbiotic nature of their relationship. Athens will 
not take the way a tyrant or monarch would, it will repay its people, thus revealing their 
relevancy to the political regime. As Pericles says, Athens “favours the many instead of the few; 
this is why it is called a democracy,”19 but it must be questioned why Athens favors the many. 
Why doesn’t Athens favor the few, the powerful, the elite? Perhaps because, as Pericles’ 
impassioned plea suggests, there is strength in numbers. The people hold a greater power than 
perhaps they understand, because the great nation Pericles describes in the funeral oration is in 
fact indebted to the very audience it falls on.  
Thucydides then contrasts the influence of the demos in the funeral oration with their 
influence in the plague. The funeral oration espoused the positive results of the Athenian demos, 
in creating a city worth renown. The people of Athens, Pericles says, are the true triumph of the 
city. He states “the Athens that I have celebrated is only what the heroism of these and their like 
have made her,”20 speaking of the noteworthy and noble citizens Athens claimed as her own. It is 
evident then that the people of Athens are capable of great good, for Athens is described as a 
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  History,	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great good. However,  the passage immediately after the funeral oration is the plague, which 
contrasts the violent capability of the demos against the lofty funeral oration. The people, 
Thucydides describes, fall into “despair”21 and in doing so exhibit their base nature.  En masse 
this plague is described as gruesome, with “men dying like sheep”22 in the streets and sacred 
places” full of corpses.”23 Immediately there is a connotation of mass amounts of people, and this 
is the definition of the demos. It is perhaps then evident that the plague represents the power of 
the people when they operate in large quantities. For it was not merely disease that infested 
Athens at the time, but with it came “lawless extravagance.”24 While sickness is not a fault 
worthy offense, lawlessness is. Yet the demos attempts to reduce its accountability in the chaos 
of the plague. Thucydides writes that the people revisited an old oracle which may have foretold 
of their current misery, but Thucydides does not allow this belief to stand. He states that “the 
verse will probably be read” in whatever way the Athenians preferred.25 This according to 
Thucydides’ previous rhetoric, is incorrect. The people have inherent power, they are capable of 
creating the noble city Pericles describes and they are vital for its continuation. Yet here, the 
people attempt to alight from their responsibility, and this, Thucydides suggests, is a flaw. 
 The demos’ unwillingness to confront its own culpability is further exemplified in 
Pericles, whom the Athenians blame for their misfortune. Thucydides writes, that “they began to 
find fault with Pericles,”26 a trope Thucydides will use frequently in describing the people’s 
relationship with their leaders. Pericles himself was not “unprepared”27 when the people 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Thucydides,	  History,	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  History,	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  History,	  2.60	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“vented”28 their misfortune upon him, rather, he called them out. He uses his understanding of 
the demos and the frequency with which they blamed leaders, to assuage and redirect Athenian 
anger. Thucydides here uses a similar rhetoric found throughout the text of acknowledging the 
power of the demos and using that culpability against it.  Pericles states that he will not be 
“cowed by their sufferings”29 thus denying the demos its most adept power move: voicing its 
dissent. Throughout the rest of the text, in the Mytilenian debate for example,  the people get 
exactly what they want. Here, Thucydides offers a deft Pericles navigating the people’s 
displeasure. He rejects blame for the war by reminding the Athenians that they, “voted it.”30 This, 
in accordance with Wohl’s argument, is perhaps Thucydides speaking through Pericles, because 
throughout the text the demos will vote on major decisions, and then refute its responsibility in 
that action. Here, Pericles does not allow the demos to recuse itself, it must be held equally 
accountable to its leaders because it voted, democratically, for this outcome.  
This is perhaps the crux of the argument Thucydides makes in using Pericles as an 
example for the ideal Athenian regime. Pericles is not the demagogue, for Thucydides says he 
never sought unjust power, but rather he is an equal in the political relationship between 
strategos and demos. Because, as Thucydides revealed in the funeral oration, it was a 
relationship. Pericles harkens the Athenians to this companionship in stating that “I am the same 
man and do not alter, it is you who change.”31 This is the focal point of Athenian democracy: the 
will of the people, which as is evident by many episodes of Athenian history, is subject to 
change. Perhaps as Wohl offered, this statement can be taken further in that Pericles stands 
emblematic of Athens and Athenian ideals, which do not change, rather its constituents do.  
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It is important that this paper begin with the argument that the demos had power, that it 
was a member of a political relationship and not the passive subject of an empire. Pericles was, 
according to Thucydides, the ideal partner for the demos in part because he demanded that the 
demos take up accountability for its part in political decision making. Pericles, though a leader, 
remained a member of the demos itself. He states, “ I voted for war, only did as you did 
yourselves,”32 reminding the Athenians that their anger with him is misguided, that he is a fellow 
citizen with a single vote. He may be the leader, but that does not remove him from the 
democratic discourse. Thucydides even writes that Athens under Pericles was “government by 
the first citizen,”33 a line historically interpreted to mean tyranny. But perhaps in light of this 
argument, there is room to see Thucydides’ Pericles as a civil servant, taking his turn as leader 
with the best intentions in mind. For Thucydides wrote that Pericles never sought immoral 
power, nor did he allow the demos to control him. Rather, Pericles, in this idealistic form, 
demanded a reciprocal relationship between the leadership of Athens and the citizenry of Athens 
for the greater common good. Indeed, Pericles calls out to the constituents, and perhaps here, 
Wohl’s argument that Pericles and Thucydides are inextricable truly applies, “cease then to 
grieve for your private afflictions, and address yourselves instead to the safety of the 
commonwealth.”34 It is here each citizen’s duty to do what the men of the funeral oration had 
done, to do what Nicias will later do in the Sicilian expedition. It is not simply for the leadership 
of Athens to rule selflessly and well, it is the responsibility of every single Athenian citizen to 
vote responsibly and with the common good in mind.  
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This is not reflective of the Athenian mindset throughout the History, nor is the reading 
many scholars have given this text. The blame for the Athenians’ loss of this war has historically 
been the tyrannical abuse of power from Athenian rulers, with blame falling on Cleon in the 
Mytilenian Debate, Alcibiades in the Sicilian expedition, and even Pericles for his powerful 
precedent. But as this chapter has hopefully explained, the fault cannot rest solely on the leaders. 
Athens was a functioning democracy, therefore, the outcome of the Peloponnesian War was the 
outcome of democracy as well. Thucydides, through Pericles, argues that the people must be 
held accountable  
The demos did have an impactful role in Athenian democracy, and therefore, Thucydides’ 
demand of their accountability is within reason. Josiah Ober argues that Athenian democracy did 
in fact work, it represented the will of the people and in effect could be argued as rule by the 
demos. He writes that “Athenian democracy proved unexpectedly workable.” And indeed, 
historically this is true. It had a phenomenal military force, it “survived two nasty oligarchic 
coups,”35 and even after the loss of the Peloponnesian War, democracy lived on. Democracy was 
capable of functioning, and Thucydides argues that it never worked so well as under Pericles and 
here perhaps the argument lies. Democracy works in a mutual relationship between leaders and 
citizens, with both taking responsibility for its outcome and both acting in the best interest of the 
community. For one man to act selflessly for the greater good would create a tyrannical society 
dependent on one benevolent man, but as Pericles states, this is a democracy for it favors the rule 
of the majority. This is why Pericles demands the people take ownership for their actions, and 
perhaps this is why Thucydides spends much of the text through the Mytilenian debate and the 
Sicilian expedition belaboring the people with responsibility.  
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Whether Pericles’ singularly successful democracy was real or not is not the subject of 
debate here, rather, Thucydides depicts Pericles as the best partner of the demos. This is perhaps 
grounds for the argument that democracy is capable of existing and of success. To begin the 
story with such a profound and evocative speech in the funeral oration could suggests that 
Thucydides did believe in the possibility of Athens’ success. It would perhaps be difficult to 
write such emotional prose to a nation Thucydides viewed as doomed. Athens’ culture, its 
prestige, its power, its ideals, its undeniably fervent “love”36 embedded in its civic nature, “such 
is the Athens” which men died for. Such was the Athens which Thucydides himself fought for, 
and which he wrote about so that perhaps no one would ever see such a valiant city fail again. 
The History is then perhaps not a condemnation of democracy in itself, but a warning for its 
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Chapter 2: The Mytilenian Debate 
“More the Audience of a Rhetorician Than the Council of a City” 
 
Thucydides curates the Mytilenian Debate to reveal the influence of the demos in the 
form of the Assembly. In placing political authority in the hands of the demos, orators had to be 
charismatic, likable, and appeal to citizen’s beliefs. In the History of the Peloponnesian War, the 
Assembly was not a place for honesty, but for tactical oration. This is the context of the 
Mytilenian Debate, which dramatizes the contest between Cleon and Diodotus over the fate of 
Athens’ renegade ally, Mytilene. Cleon and Diodotus, the two generals chosen to speak, 
represent the false oratory required to achieve political success in the Assembly. The speeches 
are written in an emotional, theatrical form, perhaps to illustrate the power of the Assembly; 
citizens demanding persuasion from politicians at the expense of the truth. An analysis of 
Aristophanes’ Knights lends itself to this argument, revealing the too similar characteristics of 
politics and theater, a similarity Thucydides criticizes in this debate. This chapter will explore the 
concept that the orators were not entirely at fault for the theatrical, dishonest practices of the 
Assembly, but rather the demos demanded pleasing rhetoric. In this way, the demos must be held 
equally accountable for the outcomes of the Assembly, rather than blame entirely befalling the 
orators.  
This paper will argue that the Mytilenian Debate does not blame the strategos or any 
other orator for the Assembly’s failure to secure Athens’ safety, but rather the demos itself. This 
argument is rooted in Thucydides’ portrayal of Diodotus as a good general, forced to use 
deception in the Assembly. It is also rooted in the argument that neither Diodotus nor Cleon truly 
win the debate, the real winner is the demos, for getting exactly what it wanted, twice. And 
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finally, this argument finds support in the theatrical nature of Thucydides’ writing, which stands 
as a cautionary example of the Assembly’s theatricality and how it distorts the political process. 
This analysis is aided by an examination of Aristophanes’ Knights, written contemporaneously to 
the Peloponnesian War and with a remarkably similar censure. 
This argument relies on the fact that the demos could effectively exert power within the 
Assembly. A brief review of the history and function of the Assembly is therefore necessary. In 
setting this debate within the Assembly, Thucydides is analyzing the power of the demos. It was 
widely accepted that  “a fundamental component of Athenian democracy was the political 
assembly,” originating with the Constitution of Solon.37 The Assembly was logistically the most 
opportune place for the demos to exert their power. The Assembly was held in the Pnyx, “a 
theater-like area”38 large enough to hold six thousand Athenian citizens. Indeed, all Athenian 
citizens were encouraged, and often expected, to attend every meeting possible, creating a sense 
of tangible power among the people, the very essence of democracy. For particularly crucial 
decisions, such as ostracism, a decision could not be made without at least six thousand Athenian 
citizens, “an eighth or so of all adult citizen males in Attica.”39 Although “the agenda, set by the 
Council,”40 was not the decision of the demos, the outcome of every vote could only be argued as 
a democratic decision. The Council consisted of five hundred Athenian citizens, chosen by lot, to 
effectively be public servants for the democracy for a full year. As Josiah Ober put in his book 
Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens, “the demos which sat at the Pnyx was demographically 
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quite similar to the ‘imagined’ demos,”41 assuring the populace that the decision made at the 
Assembly, whatever it was, was the decision of the Athenian people.  
While citizenship was not universal, its limitation offered a sense of community and 
identity to those within the Athenian citizenry. By the time of the Mytilenian Debate, Athenian 
citizenship had been limited to “those whose parents were both Athenians,”42 under the 
Citizenship Law of 451, promoted by the strategos Pericles. This continued the belief in 
autochthony, that Athenians had sprung from the very earth of Attica, to legitimize Athenian 
rule, and eternally bind its citizens to their political state. As a citizen, an intentionally limited 
group, Athenian males had a responsibility to their community to be an active member of 
politics. Robin Osborne outlines in his Athens and Athenian Democracy that “at the age of 
eighteen an Athenian boy became a citizen by being recognized as a member of the local 
community, the deme.”43 This entrance into local politics was the foundation for the greater 
Assembly’s function. In reliance on a sense of familial responsibility, Athens created a 
politically active citizenry tied to family and country. While citizens were not beholden to any 
political interests, Ober writes that every citizen voted  “in the best interests of his state and of 
himself.”44 In this way, the Assembly truly was the voice of the people. However, in the 
Mytilenian debate, Thucydides does not portray this as a beneficial form of government.  
Thucydides depicts a fundamental flaw in the Assembly’s reliance on oratory to make 
political decisions, which created a power struggle for popular votes. The Assembly began with 
the announcement of the agenda, followed by a debate, if needed, and then a vote, “normally by 
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a show of hands.”45  To debate in front of thousands of citizens in the open air would have been 
an extraordinary feat of oratory, instantly limiting the voices heard to the trained elites. Although 
the debate was open to every citizen, “some men spoke more often than others,”46 typically, 
those who could afford the time and cost that went into oratory training.  
These vocal men were some of the most permanent fixtures of Athenian politics, as most 
political offices were chosen by lottery and were often restricted by term limitations. Unlike 
political offices, citizens were not limited in speaking in the Assembly. As Osborne writes, 
“continuity as Athenian politics enjoyed was provided not by the Council but by those who 
spoke in the Assembly,”47 revealing the power of speech in politics. The very nature of the 
Assembly placed political and military decision in the hands of nonprofessionals, creating a need 
for trained specialists to enlighten and educated the masses. To those Athenians who “had advice 
to give”48 went the possibility of swaying the entire audience with their rhetoric. Although as 
Osborne writes, “it was upon principles, and not on technical information, that crucial Athenian 
decisions depended – decisions about going to war.”49 It would thus appear that in times of 
emotional distress, expertise was less favorable than powerful oratory suffused with cultural 
ideals.  
In this way, the Assembly created an opportunity for charismatic orators. As Osborne 
suggested, the citizens of the Assembly could be swayed more by principle than by expertise or 
skill, a fact easily exploited by a trained rhetorician. However, it is important to note that the 
power was never truly in the hands of the orator, for they were always at the mercy of the demos’ 
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opinion. The Assembly was a place of debate, of conversation, the demos was as much a 
participant as any single orator who tried to speak. Many orators were “periodically interrupted 
by laughter, applause, or heckling”50 depending on the reaction of the demos. As Ober records, 
when the general Demosthenes spoke “during a key meeting in 346,”51 his political opponents 
disturbed his speech with mockery, and “the Assembly men had found their quips amusing.”52 It 
was not simply political opponents orators had to guard against, but the demos itself, which 
could turn against an orator for one failed, or boring, speech. It is particularly troubling that 
Demosthenes’ speech was during a key meeting, one of importance to the Athenian state, and yet 
when one of the stategoi spoke, the Assembly encouraged his mockery. In this instance, it would 
appear that the demos did not see the gravitas of their decision.  
Indeed, as Arlene Saxonhouse puts forth in Free Speech and Democracy in Ancient 
Athens, “the Assembly holds the speaker, not themselves, accountable for their decisions,”53 
excusing the demos from blame. Even if the Assembly voted incorrectly, voted for a policy or 
military action that ended in drastic failure for the Athenian state, the punishment follows the 
orator who led them to that decision. This lack of responsibility on behalf of the Athenian 
citizenry creates the environment in which they can laugh at Demosthenes, for they are 
spectators, free of reprehension. This is particularly troubling given the power of the Assembly. 
Osborne writes that  any form of popular “support lead to very much the same position, a 
position of authority.”54 While the power rested firmly in the hands of the demos, accountability 
was given to their chosen orator. The Assembly held power in fundamental legal capabilities. 
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Ober reports whatever the Assembly passed “ became a decree which had the force of law unless 
and until it was successfully challenged as having contravened the established nomoi.”55 That is 
the power of the demos, the power to fundamentally change and order the Athenian state, yet 
historians seem to suggests that this power was not checked or protected from charismatic 
orators, or the disregard of the citizens.  
This is the political world in which Thucydides wrote the History of the Peloponnesian 
War, this is the context for the Mytilenian Debate. It must be noted that the Mytilenian Debate is 
carefully crafted by Thucydides. This is the fundamental component of this paper’s argument, 
for Thucydides did not write objective history, rather a didactic narrative, of which the 
Mytilenian Debate is part. He has edited the story to fit a specific narrative, using Cleon and 
Diodotus, two generals, as representative of a greater lesson. Thucydides observes that there was 
“much expression of opinion upon both sides”56 of the debate, yet only offers the two voices of 
Diodotus and Cleon. David Cohen would argue, in his “Justice, Interest, and Politician 
Deliberation in Thucydides,” that the debate concerns a “fundamental question of how the state 
ought to be governed”57 and places the blame for state failure on the generals who abuse their 
political power. Cohen calls the debate a “moral criticism”58 of demagogues, suggesting the 
blame for political action, much like the Athenians believed themselves, rested on the shoulders 
of the orators. Similarly, Felix Wasserman in his article Post-Periclean Democracy in Action: 
The Mytilenian Debate interprets the debate as the failure of the statesmen, rather than the 
demos, to secure Athens’ best interest. He puts forth that “the Mytilenian case is the first stage 
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on the road to the catastrophe of 404,”59 and suggests that the loss of the Peloponnesian War was 
due to the ineffective leaders who succeeded Pericles. He holds that Cleon is the “vulgarized 
replica of Pericles”60 rather than the demos. In summary, Wasserman holds that  “the main 
responsibility for the decline of Athenian democracy: public affairs falling from the hands of the 
statesman into those of the demagogue,”61 removing any onus from the demos for Athens’ loss.  
From the introduction of the debate the reader knows Thucydides agrees with Diodotus in 
the pardoning of Mytilene. He steps out of the narrative to call the decree in favor of destruction 
“horrid cruelty.”62 Before the debate even begins Thucydides has alerted his audience to the right 
side in his narrative. Another editorial decision that shapes this debate is that “Thucydides chose 
to report”63 the second of two consecutive debates. The first debate was born out of the 
insurrection on the island of Mytilene, an ally of Athens that defected to the Spartans and tried to 
inspire a mass revolt. The Athenians halted this revolt, captured the instigators, and brought the 
decision of what to do about Mytilene to the Athenian Assembly. This initial debate resulted in 
the Athenian citizens voting for Cleon’s decree, selling all the Mytilenian women and children 
into slavery and killing all the men, to set a fearful precedent among all Athenian allies. The 
initial debate was credited to “the fury of the moment,”64 but the “repentance”65 of the Athenian 
Assembly resulted in a redo. These highly volatile terms are a criticism of the effectiveness of 
the Assembly. Thucydides had upheld Pericles, deceased at the time of the Mytilenian Debate, as 
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the “ablest alike in counsel and in action,”66 for specifically advising against “anger”67 in 
political discourse. It was this wisdom, this temperance that Pericles was known for that 
Thucydides lauded him for, and his depiction of the Mytilenian debate is the antithesis of that 
image. This must have been done with intent, perhaps an intent to reveal how ineffective the 
Assembly was at governing a military campaign. This second debate is particularly notable 
because of its impracticality; in war, there are no second chances. The depiction of the Athenian 
envoy hastily attempting to halt the destruction of Mytilene is as dramatic as it is impractical. 
The boat does get there in time and stops the destruction, but to consider this the operation of the 
Classical world’s greatest navy is incredible. A wavering military command controls Athens, as 
evident by the fact that anger won the first Mytilenian Debate, and regret incited the second. 
The second debate suggests that Thucydides disavows the Athenian Assembly and by 
association Athenian democracy to govern during a war. Though Cleon and Diodotus oppose 
each other in the debate, they both agree that the act of debating such a crucial issue is dangerous 
and flawed. Cleon, the general in favor of leveling the Mytilenians, condemns the political 
assembly, calls the voting citizens  “very slaves to the pleasure of the ear, and more like the 
audience of a rhetorician than the council of a city.”68 Cleon, perhaps, does not trust the 
Assembly to choose his decree again, and although Cohen would argue that Cleon is espousing 
“demagogic oratory,”69 it cannot be argued that Cleon does not genuinely believe there is danger 
in the Assembly’s choice. He declares to the Assembly that “your empire is despotism and your 
subjects are disaffected conspirators.”70 He claims that “no one state has ever injured you as 
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much as Mytilene.”71 He proclaims to the Assembly that the “persons to blame are you who are 
so foolish as to institute these contests.”72 He describes the debate as “suicidal”73 for Athens, 
suggesting that in “such contests” Athens “takes the dangers for herself.”74 Cleon, for all his 
hyperbole and inflammatory language, seems to believe in his stance. He truly seems to believe 
that a merciless precedent would protect Athens from harm. His fear is nearly palpable in his 
speech, and it can perhaps be argued that Cleon speaks honestly, that is to say, he thinks he 
speaks the truth.  
As Saxonhouse interprets, Cleon speaks passionately, freely, “with absolute candor.”75 
He espouses terrible acts, as Thucydides condemns, but it cannot be said that Cleon does not 
speak the truth to the Athenian Assembly. For a demagogic rhetorician, he seems to offer the 
people the truth in an effort to protect Athens the best way he believes he can. In beginning the 
second debate with Cleon’s speech the audience gains a fervent understanding of the importance 
of this debate. The perceived consequences of this debate are perilous, as Cleon aggressively 
describes. Whether or not the suggested consequences were well founded is not of great 
importance to the debate; the crux of the matter rests on what the demos felt during this debate. 
The fear, the urgency, the fate of Athens, these may all have been rhetorical tools used by a 
trained orator, though this does not necessarily suggest falsehood. The fear in Cleon’s words, as 
Thucydides describes them, is tangible, and was perhaps the companion of every orator who 
depended on the volatile Assembly. 
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While Cleon speaks candidly, Diodotus, the good guy, must use deception to persuade 
the audience. Although Thucydides supports Diodotus’ faction as right, and propels his audience 
to agree from the beginning, Diodotus cannot argue for morality or justice. As Saxonhouse 
reveals, Diodotus’ name means “gift of Zeus” and he is the “son of good power,”76 a somewhat 
glaring signal of his morality. As noted before, Thucydides carefully curated the entire History, 
not least of all the speeches. Diodotus speaks after Cleon in the second debate, after the fear 
mongering, after the promise of destruction if the Athenians fail to destroy Mytilene. He must 
combat Cleon’s diatribe in a way that overcomes the emotions of a majority of citizens in the 
Assembly. He begins by describing the way a political assembly should work, with honest men’s 
words falling on honest men’s ears, but remarks that “this is not our way.”77 Rather, the 
Athenians are swayed by rhetoric and distrust honesty, and it is the “the city”78 that is hurt by 
this. He continues, “the moment that a man is suspected of giving advice, however good, from 
corrupt motives, we feel such a grudge against him for the gain which after all we are not certain 
he will receive, that we deprive the city of its benefit.”79 At this moment, all Athenian citizens 
should have been wary of Diodotus’ speech. After declaring that honesty and advice were 
useless, he will surely not do so. Diodotus already lost the debate once. If he truly believed his 
decree served the best interest of Athens, he could not afford to lose again. In his speech, it 
seems, he is committed to lying, to telling the citizens what they want to hear, in order to do what 
is necessary. He openly reveals the main flaw of the Assembly to its constituents, that “he must 
deceive in order to succeed,”80 and the citizenry still votes for his decree. He uses the rhetoric of 
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“our interest”81 to persuade the Assembly, after telling them that he did not believe honesty had 
any place in this debate, and it works.  In reading this debate, Thucydides does not offer a 
hopeful interpretation of the assembly. He suggests that the audience simply did not mind being 
lied to by Diodotus if it meant achieving their desired ends. In this way, the Assembly disturbs 
that political process, without heeding honesty or expertise, and simply choosing the orator that 
sounds better.  
This is perhaps best seen in Thucydides forcing Diodotus, the ostensibly moral character, 
to use deception, revealing the misguided nature of Athenian politics. Saxonhouse interprets that 
this debate is written with “a searing emotional and dramatic power”82 unlike much of this 
historical prose. It is a hyperbolic, emotional, and theatrical piece, of two generals trying to save 
Athens by utilizing the Assembly’s power. In the first debate, Diodotus lost, but in the second he 
uses rhetoric to play on the Assembly’s base emotions, revealing the descent of an honorable 
man in Athenian politics. Cleon has defined justice to be vengeance, and the audience has 
already believed that story once. Diodotus, though he has justice and morality on his side, must 
use clever rhetoric to win the audience. The blame is not placed on Cleon, however. Rather, it is 
the Athenian people, unwilling to listen to an honest man, that turn Diodotus into a rhetorician. 
In the second debate, Diodotus is forced to adhere to the rules of the Assembly and speak things 
he does not believe in order to save Athens. “The tragedy of Diodotus’ speech”83 is that he must 
betray his morals to save his city. As a good man, Zeus given, he must do all he can to save his 
city, even if that means moral corruption. For this, Thucydides blames the Assembly. Diodotus 
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“must practice the subterfuge he had denounced”84 and corrupt his inherent goodness. This is the 
dramatic performance of good men in politics, as told by Thucydides.  
 The blame for the corruption of Diodotus, and the inability of the Assembly to function, 
lies with the Athenian citizens. This is supported by the fact that both Cleon and Diodotus, 
written through Thucydides, “blame the citizens themselves in their assembled state as the cause 
of its failure.”85 The generals completely oppose each other in content, yet they both avowedly 
agree that the Assembly is to blame for any harm done to Athens in the course of this political 
discussion. Furthermore it is worth noting that neither general truly won the debate. Cleon’s 
victory was taken away from him, even though Assembly decrees were rarely subject to change. 
He declares in the debate that “the most alarming feature in the case is the constant change of 
measures,”86 likely referring to his own sudden loss. But even in Diodotus’ victory, there is a 
lingering reminder of his corruption. Although he succeeds in saving the Athenians from 
committing an atrocity, “it is hardly the victory of the ‘moderate city’” which he called for.87 He 
has to become part of the political system which Thucydides suggests is worthy of disgust. 
Indeed, he saved Athens from committing an atrocity, but that victory seems hardly the message 
of the debate. Indeed, the fate of Mytilene is hardly described, and after the debate nothing about 
Athens seems changed. The focus of the debate, therefore, was perhaps less to do with Athens 
and her allies, and the Assembly itself.  
 Debates appear throughout the History and, concurrent with this analysis of the 
Mytilenian Debate, few are concerned with the truth. “The Athenians put forward the view that 
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the assembly is a purely deliberative body” as early in History as the debate at Sparta.88 There is 
a description of public speaking as practical, as opposed to moral. As Cohen would argue, 
“deliberation consists in the careful calculation of interest” not the inquiry of justice.89 This 
adheres to Diodotus’ claim that “we are not in a court of justice, but in a political assembly; and 
the question is not justice, but how to make Mytilene useful to Athens.”90 Throughout the 
History, there is a  “a moral commentary”91 on the relationship between ethics and service to 
one’s state. As Cohen observes, “many events of greater moment are either passed over by 
Thucydides” or barely described, but the Mytilenian Debate goes on for pages, simply in 
dialogue between two generals over the fate of an ally.92 This attention to Mytilene cannot go 
unanalyzed. The suggestion that “speech in the Assembly must entail the art of deception”93 and 
that this corrupts decent men is a fundamental argument of Thucydides’ History. It adheres to a 
broader argument that Cleon reveals, and will later be addressed in the Melian dialogue, that the 
Athenian empire is “built upon power, tyrannically exercised, and not upon justice.”94 These 
fundamental components of the Assembly reveal an inherent flaw in democracy that prevents the 
city from benefiting, specifically because the audience of the debate sees politics as theater, a 
fact which Thucydides alludes to in writing the debate “more like a Sophoclean drama than 
conventional history.”95 
 The connection between theater and democracy cannot be denied, but in Thucydides’ 
depiction, the two have become intertwined.  Athenians “in the assembly were, consequently 
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influenced by their experiences as members of theatrical audiences and vice versa,”96 perhaps to 
a condemnable degree. For the Assembly and the theater to be so similar put an expectation to 
entertain upon political orators. Indeed both theater and democracy shared undeniable 
characteristics. Both were held in outdoor venues, and  “the seating in the theater was egalitarian, 
as it was in the Assembly and in court.”97 But perhaps most detrimental to political norms was 
that  “in each case, the outcome was decided by a mass audience sitting in judgment over 
competing elites.”98 For theater to be considered “political forum”99 would not endanger the fate 
of Athens, but for politics to become theater might. As Ober wrote, “the political orator had 
much to gain from being seen in ‘dramatic’ guise.”100 The ability to speak clearly, to entertain, to 
persuade a crowd, made for a powerful politician. The inherent function of the Assembly as a 
spoken political environment invested power in those who could speak well and play upon the 
crowd’s emotion, not unlike an actor. Comedy, like history, was “firmly grounded in the culture 
and politics of its day,”101 and the blurred lines between the two created the distorted political 
world Thucydides writes on. Osborne wrote that “the relationship of Athenian drama, and 
perhaps also forensic oratory and public sculpture, to political life may have been particularly 
close,”102 a relationship which Thucydides and some of his contemporaries condemned.  
Aristophanes, in his Knights, criticizes the power of the demos similarly to that of 
Thucydides during the Mytilenian Debate. Aristophanes seems to continue the Mytilenian debate 
in a fictional, crude, and protracted way, with a similar outcome. Knights personifies the 
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democratic body in Demos, an old man who holds the generals Nicias and Demosthenes, both 
present in Thucydides’ work as well, as slaves. The two convince a self proclaimed “ignorant”103 
sausage seller to become the new ruler over Athenian politics, and take the place of Cleon as the 
favorite of their master, Demos. They promise that he will become “supremely great”104 once he 
is favored by Demos. Their initial arguments are childish, brutish, and occur in the senate.105 
Aristophanes’ suggests that in a democracy, power is given to the man who yells louder. Indeed, 
the Sausage-Seller claims he has a greater right to rule than Cleon because he can “shout three 
times as loud.”106 Indeed this exemplifies one of the foundational issues with the Assembly, that 
to be heard the speaker had to be overtly aggressive. As Aristophanes illustrates, this lead to 
norm of compromise, in which substance was sacrificed for volume and power was given to the 
more vocal member.   
Aristophanes does not make Cleon the winner of this vulgar debate, much like 
Thucydides’ Cleon, he is at the mercy of Demos. Demos abandons Cleon for a “pair of shoes.”107 
Indeed, he forces Cleon and the Sausage Seller to fight for his affection, declaring that “to the 
one who treats me best I intend to award the reins of the Pnyx.”108 It is this notion of “treat me 
best” that echoes the words of Diodotus. Demos, much like the demos, seeks pleasure more than 
righteousness, and awards political power to the orator who offers it. This offers a similar 
discussion to Diodotus, who spoke what the demos wanted to hear, rather than the truth, and was 
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victorious for it. Aristophanes seems to concur with this statement, suggesting that the demos 
does not wield power in a beneficial way.   
The similarities continue during the debate of Cleon and the Sausage Seller for Demos’ 
love. The chorus proclaims that Demos is the “king of the Greeks” yet still has none of the 
“blame.”109 This is the crux of the problem of the Assembly, that the power ultimately rests with 
the demos. Cleon is ultimately powerless, and indeed Aristophanes portrays Cleon as running 
around the entire play attempting to pacify the aggressive Demos. This is a depiction of any 
orator or statesmen, as constantly jumping to the task of the demos. Unlike Thucydides, 
Aristophanes does not have Cleon and the Sausage Seller debate for a moral decision, but the 
sentiment of competition remains the same. Aristophanes offers no sympathy for the Assembly, 
suggesting that the argument for manipulative or exploitative orators is incorrect, that orators are 
not the problem of democracy. Demos proclaims that “in this foolishness of mine / I relish / my 
daily pap and I pick one thieving / political leader to fatten ; I raise him up, and when he’s full, I 
swat him down.”110 It is clear that the demos is the blame for the failures of democracy, not the 
statesmen who take on the blame.  Thucydides condemns the people of the assembly for their 
inability to do what is right for the city, and Aristophanes agrees.  
“All mankind fears you like a man with tyrannical power. But you’re easily lead astray; 
you enjoy being flattered and thoroughly deceived, and every speechmaker has you 
gaping.”111  
The fault is of the Athenian assembly, the entire demos, once it comes together to make political 
decisions. It fails, in the instance of both Thucydides and Aristophanes, to come to the correct 
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conclusion that will benefit the Athenian regime. Though both authors wrote in very different 
genres, they wrote as contemporaries. Both witnessed the failure of the demos to protect Athens 
during the Peloponnesian War, and both seem to blame the demos for this military failure. 
Aristophanes Knights though hyperbolic and fictional, gives credence to Thucydides’ argument 
that the demos does not serve the best interest of Athens, particularly in the form of the political 
assembly.   
 It is clear, therefore, that the Assembly, a fundamental component of Athenian 
democracy, was flawed not by the work of manipulative orators, but by the demos itself. 
Thucydides’ depiction of the Mytilenian debate, as well as Aristophanes’ Knights, reveals the 
misguided power of the demos over the Athenian state. Thucydides portrays Diodotus as an 
example of the necessary corruption involved in speaking before the Assembly, forcing a good 
man to speak falsely in order to fulfill his duty to the state. More than this, Diodotus tells the 
Assembly that he is going to speak falsely to appease their emotional reactions, and they allow it. 
Thucydides depicts no outcry, the Assembly seems to prefer a false, but pleasant, orator rather 
than an honest one. Indeed, Cleon, the demagogic orator, fails to secure the support of the demos. 
The suggested fear, by that of Wasserman and Cohen, was in the manipulative nature of orators, 
but Thucydides seems to refute this. Rather, it is the demos that manipulates the orators, bending 
them to the rhetoric they want to hear. Thucydides argument is supported by his contemporary 
Aristophanes in his work Knights. Demos, the slave owner of Athenian generals, demands 
entertainment, gifts, and contests for his love from the orators who seek his favor.  
It is notable that this interpretation is found in both History and Knights because these are 
the two genres in which this political problem is most apparent. It is the inherent nature of the 
Assembly to demand entertaining and charismatic orators, for its close proximity to theater. 
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Indeed, both theater and the Assembly were held in outdoor arenas, gathered large crowds of 
Athenian citizens, and relied on the participation and approval of its audience. This inherent 
value placed on the audience is the crux of the problem. Both Aristophanes and Thucydides 
suggest that there is too much power given to the Assembly, without the inhibition of 
responsibility. The Assembly was the powerhouse of the people’s voice; it was the essence of 
democracy, yet the demos is not help culpable. This is a major flaw in democracy, according to 


















Chapter 3: The Sicilian Expedition 
“As If They Had Not Themselves Voted For It” 
 Thucydides’ history culminates in the failure of the Sicilian expedition. Though the text 
and the war continue on, this is a tangible moment of decline. Thucydides does not, however, 
depict the expedition as a failure of the generals who lead it. Rather, this was a failure of the 
demos who voted in favor of the expedition and made disastrous leadership decisions throughout. 
The speeches of Nicias and Alcibiades, the campaign in Sicily, and the death of Nicias are all 
purposefully written to reveal a crucial misgiving with democracy, the emotional rule of the 
demos. It is important to emphasize the democratic decisions to invade Sicily and remove 
Alcibiades from command. These were not decisions from corrupt or misguided elites, rather 
they were the true results of democracy. They were, according to Thucydides, poor decisions that 
lead to the failure of the Sicilian expedition, and in emphasizing their failure, Thucydides depicts 
another flaw of democracy in the emotional rule of the demos. The emotional power of the 
demos is depicted in the debates between Nicias and Alcibiades, which are rife with desperately 
passionate rhetoric, depicting a nearly erotic sense of national pride. This episode perhaps serves 
to illustrate a major flaw in democracy, the inability of mass emotions to govern.    
 Thucydides depicts the Sicilian expedition as effectively the end of the war. Although the 
Athenians did continue to fight until their ultimate defeat by the Spartans in 404 BCE, 
Thucydides describes the Sicilian expedition as a “total destruction”112 of the Athenian navy. It is 
the moment the Athenians realize they are fallible. To read books six and seven of the History,  
one would assume that the Athenian polis and empire ended there. Thucydides writes that their 
defeat was “was the greatest Hellenic achievement of any in this war, or, in [his] opinion, in 
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Hellenic history,”113 inserting his own view into the story. He ends book seven in stating, 
“everything was destroyed,” suggesting a certain, if not immediate, end to Athens and the 
History. But it is not in fact the end. The text itself goes on for many more pages, and Athenian 
democracy exists for many more years. Even after Athens is defeated by the Spartans it 
continues on. Even after a briefly imposed rule by tyrants, Athenian democracy continues on. If 
Athens did not meet its destruction at the end of book seven, it is worth asking what did. The 
poignant insertion of authorial voice in the Sicilian expedition demands analysis.  
 This chapter will argue that the Sicilian expedition was a cautionary tale against the 
violent emotion of the demos, which went unchecked during this expedition, and was the cause 
of the Athenians’ defeat. This is perhaps the hopeless moment Thucydides has been preparing 
the reader for from the beginning. The stasis at Corcyra, the Plague, the Melian Dialogue, these 
moments have been slowly removing the beautiful pieces of democracy Pericles illustrates in his 
Funeral Oration. It is then fitting that the stories Thucydides wove together would culminate in 
the disastrous Sicilian expedition. Thucydides removed the veneer of civility in Corcyra, 
unearthed depravity and selfishness in the plague, and revealed the ignoble underbelly of 
political relations in Melos. In the Sicilian expedition, Thucydides takes the story down another 
rung and reduces democracy to a shameful defeat far from home. In this way, though the story of 
Athens does not end, Thucydides’ story does. Democracy falls from a noble political regime of 
the people to a dying man on distant shores. Thucydides does not allow the Athenians to blame 
the “oracles and soothsayers,” nor does he allow them to blame “the orators who had joined in 
promoting the expedition.”114 He places blame on the Athenian citizenry, though remarks they do 
not take the blame themselves, rather reacting to the defeat “just as if they had not themselves 
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voted it.”115 The depiction of the defeat and the description of the demos’ reaction are both told in 
the authorial voice, not through speeches. They are, as Thucydides writes, “[his] opinion”116 and 
in that way, must be depicted as a vital lesson to the story. The expedition fits within a thread of 
revealing and devastating depictions of Athenian democracy, culminating in what Thucydides 
describes as a final blow. This “total destruction” is perhaps not of the Athenian state, but of the 
belief that democracy is all powerful, infallible.  
 Thucydides describes the motivation for the Sicilian expedition as, from the beginning, 
the greedy decision of the demos. The first lines of book six are a critique of the collective 
Athenians’ decision to invade Sicily. Thucydides steps into the narrative to tell the reader that 
this expedition was a move to “conquer the island.”117 There is no credence given to any 
argument for the Egesteans and their requested aid; this is a covetous endeavor on the part of 
“the Athenians.”118 Thucydides further reduces sympathy for the expedition, suggesting that the 
Athenians invaded while “ignorant of its size and of the number of its inhabitants.”119 This 
ignorance is not innocence, but rather carelessness as a result of Athenian desire. Thucydides 
writes the demos as “being ambitious in real truth of conquering the whole.”120 Here again, 
Thucydides is the authority, the arbiter of “real truth,” and the reader is reminded that this is his 
story. The demos begins “a war not much inferior to that against the Peloponnesians,”121 not out 
of necessity or safety then but ambition. The Athenians hold an assembly on whether or not they 
should invade, and Thucydides writes that the decision was influenced heavily by “the money, of 
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which, it was said, there was an abundance.”122 Even though the report of their own envoys was 
“as attractive as it was untrue,”123 the Athenians were blinded by the possibility for gain. This 
was a decision of the Assembly, a collective and democratic decision to invade a noncombatant 
threat. They “voted to send sixty ships to Sicily”124 with “dubious”125 knowledge and precedent. 
From the beginning, Thucydides depicts the expedition as a predatory move by the Athenian 
people. 
 Indeed, as with the Mytilenian debate, Thucydides uses an Assembly to portray the 
intractable power of the people. Nicias, who was given command “against his will,”126 speaks 
against the expedition in the Assembly. His innocence in this endeavor is exemplified in the fact 
that he did not want command. He was on the right side, according to Thucydides, from the 
beginning. His speech in the Assembly against the Sicilian expedition reveals the nature of the 
crowd before him. His speaks in response to the demos’ decision, therefore it can be assumed 
that he is not the instigator of the fervent crowd. Rather, he serves as the voice of reason, 
revealing the flaws in their initial campaign strategies. He speaks against the group’s “ardour” 
and “ambition,”127 which lead the Athenians to their decision. He, like Thucydides, rejects the 
argument that the expedition was to honor their “alliance”128 with the Egestaeans. This 
expedition was a war “with which we have nothing to do,”129 according to Nicias. The motive 
was rather ““the mad dream of conquest.”130 It is the far off promise of glory, the “object of 
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admiration”131 that is “tempting”132 the Athenians. More besides, the Athenians are “puffed up”133 
by the misfortune of their enemies, creating an overblown sense of confidence that urges them 
onwards to “the conquest of Sicily.”134 This expedition is therefore the result of unmitigated 
Athenian emotions, most notably, pride and fear. Pride from the young Athenians who are 
“overjoyed”135 at the prospect of a successful and profitable mission of the mission. And fear 
from those like Nicias, who feel “alarm” at the thought of this hasty undertaking. However, 
Nicias himself admits the failure of his argument in that those who reject the mission will be 
“shamed down, for fear of being thought a coward.”136 Nicias himself cannot deny that he is 
asking his fellow men to admit their fallibility. In voting against the expedition, the constituents 
would be conceding the possibility of Athens’ loss. This is the source of the “shame” Nicias 
attempts to mitigate, yet cannot divest from his side of the debate. Those who vote against the 
expedition are willing to admit that Athens is not infallible, that their great regime is in fact 
mortal, like everyone else’s. The unwillingness of the demos to admit this is perhaps 
understandable given the rhetoric of Athenian superiority, which Alcibiades’ champions on the 
other side of the debate. 
 Nicias’ depiction of shame and cowardice explains Alcibiades’ overzealously patriotic 
response. Alcibiades rejects Nicias’ wary approach, and responds as though it were insulting  
Athens’ ability to conquer Sicily. He describes the Sicilians as “motley rabble”137 and as a 
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“mob.”138 According to Alcibiades, the people of Sicily are inferior to Athens, but more than this, 
so is its government. They “easily change their institutions”139 and are easily divided “by fair 
words or party strife.”140 Alcibiades has changed the nature of the debate from a conversation 
about Athens’ decision to invade Sicily to a competition between civilizations. Furthermore, the 
Sicilians are a people “without any feeling of patriotism,”141 which the Athenians view as a 
weakness. Alcibiades argues, “in this state of things, what reason can we give to ourselves for 
holding back.”142 To vote on the side of Nicias would, by Alcibiades’ logic, suggest that a 
Sicilian band of unpatriotic rabble could defeat the Athenians. This is not to say that Alcibiades 
manipulated the crowd into a frenzy. As stated before, the Athenians had already decided to 
invade Sicily before this debate. Furthermore, Nicias begun the debate warding against shame 
and fear on his side of the decision. The crux of this issue, which was among the Assembly 
before Alcibiades spoke, comes from the Athenian belief that victory must be constant. 
Alcibiades remarks that their empire exists only with “a constant readiness to support all.”143 It is 
constant vigilance that keeps Athens alive because, as Alcibiades says, “we cannot fix the exact 
point at which our empire shall stop.”144 He continues that, “if we cease to rule, we are in danger 
of being ruled ourselves,”145  in this instance, by a mob of Sicilians. To admit that Athens may 
not win this expedition, even for tactical and logical reasons, would concede Athens’ superiority. 
Alcibiades declares the war already begun, and if Athens doesn’t strike, they must “change 
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[their] habits and make them like [Sicily’s].”146 Nicias’ logical argument cannot combat 
Alcibiades’ intensely patriotic plea, for the expedition was never about practicality, and entirely 
about pride. 
 This is not to say that Alcibiades was a faultless character, but rather that his faults were 
representative of Athens’ superiority. Thucydides describes Alcibiades as “ambitious of a 
command” and wanting “to gain in wealth and reputation”147 from this expedition. This is the 
exact same desire Athens has for this expedition as well. Alcibiades was seen as a “pretender to 
the tyranny,”148  as was Athens at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, it was perhaps the 
reason this war began. The Spartan representatives at the first congress at Sparta depict Athens as 
the “aggressor” of the war, and depict Athenians as “adventurous beyond their power.”149 
Furthermore, Pericles states that the Athenian empire is “a tyranny; to take it perhaps was wrong, 
but to let it go is unsafe.”150 Alcibiades then is not entirely at fault for this expedition’s impetus 
or failure. Thucydides even allows that Alcibiades’ “conduct of war was as good as could be 
desired,”151 suggesting that he was not responsible for this military failure. He further writes that 
when the Athenians took Alcibiades out of command they began to “ruin the city.”152  Athens 
was perhaps then already an ambitious nation, not born out of Alcibiades’ speech. Furthermore, 
Alcibiades says that he is “naturally envied”153 by his fellow Athenians, and this is perhaps more 
than a personal boast. Alcibiades has wealth and infamy, which Nicias states is the nefarious 
desire of all the men voting for the expedition. It is therefore arguable that Alcibiades, though 
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pompous, is the kind of Athenian many desire to be. Nicias stands as his antithesis. He rejects 
power and this expedition even though he admittedly stands to “gain in honour by such a 
course.”154 The Athenians choose the irresponsible possibility for power, perhaps not because 
Alcibiades is not the instigator of Athenian tyranny, but rather its manifestation.  
 The demos supports this argument by democratically choosing to invade Sicily. Nicias 
attempts to use the foundation of democracy to appeal to the demos’ better nature; he suggests 
they put the decision to a second vote. He declares “if you wish to show yourself a good citizen, 
put the question to the vote, and take a second time the opinion of the Athenians,”155 expecting 
them to do what he, and Thucydides, believe to be the right thing. He is betrayed, however, by 
the overwhelming emotional response to Alcibiades’ patriotic speech. Thucydides writes that “all 
alike fell in love with the enterprise.”156 Even after Nicias inundates the Athenians with details on 
how they could logistically manage an expedition of this size, they are convinced of their 
victory, thinking “the expedition would be the safest in the world.”157 Thucydides writes that “the 
few that liked it not, feared to appear unpatriotic by holding up their hands against it, and so kept 
quiet,”158  revealing a major flaw of democracy. “The enthusiasm of the majority”159 overruled 
the voices of some of the citizens. The emotional zeal of the masses inhibited the reason and 
consideration needed to succeed in war. The debate was not won by lengthy tactical discussion, 
but by an impassioned understanding of Athenian superiority.  
 The actual expedition reveals the inability of the demos to rule even further, particularly 
the decision to remove Alcibiades. Though the expedition was Alcibiades’ plan, and as 
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Thucydides said, he was a decent general, the demos removes him from command due to the 
destruction of many Athenian herms, of which he is the suspected culprit. He is suspected of 
wrongdoing, and of sacrilege towards the mysteries, and before his trial defects to Sparta. 
According to “the citizens,”160 Alcibiades was to blame for many misfortunes at home. As 
Thucydides writes, “in short, everywhere something was found to create suspicion against 
Alcibiades.”161 Perhaps it was valid suspicion against Alcibiades, or perhaps it was simply 
jealousy for Alcibiades’ luxurious lifestyle. Regardless, the Athenian citizens intentionally 
removed one of their best generals from the field during a foreign invasion.  
This is just one of the mistakes that the Athenians makes during their campaign however. 
In Nicias’ dispatch “to the Athenians”162  en masse, he reveals the desperate conditions of his 
men. He writes his message in a letter, because “the messengers, either through their inability to 
speak, or through failure of memory, or from a wish to please the multitude, might not report the 
truth.”163 The desire to please the multitude reveals a severe problem with democracy. While 
Nicias and his men face defeat and “famine,”164 they are equally preoccupied with the failure of 
their own government to help them, or worse, their unwillingness to do so. Nicias writes to the 
Athenians that “it is your nature to love to be told the best of things, and then to blame the 
teller”165 should things go awry. In doing so, Nicias almost surely is prefacing ill fated news, but 
he knows he has to appeal to the Athenians’ nationalistic pride, just as Alcibiades did in the 
original debate. Nicias prefaces his news that the Athenians “are not to think that either your 
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generals or your solders have ceased to be a match”166 for the Sicilians, because again, that would 
be shameful. He must remind the Athenians that he and his men are still Athenian, meaning 
superior, but at the same time must ask for either more aid or an end to this expedition. He is the 
self sacrificing general at the mercy of the Athenian demos, as evident by his plea to be removed 
due to illness. He writes to the Athenian people that he “did you much good service,”167 he must 
resign due to “disease in the kidneys.”168  And even so, the Athenians “refuse to accept his 
resignation.”169 They have removed their most successful general and detained their most ill. 
Thucydides, at this moment, is revealing the ineptitude of the Athenians to govern a military 
campaign. Their emotion, their suspicion, their inability to handle ill fated news, all result in the 
loss of the campaign.  
  Moreover, during the campaign the Athenians enact poor foreign policy decisions. The 
Athenians continue fighting “two wars at once,”170 as Nicias warned against, reaching a “pitch of 
pertinacity which no one would have believed possible.”171 Thucydides continues his disbelief at 
the Athenian’s leadership in extoling that “no one could have imagined”172 the demos would 
continue the endeavor in Sicily while Athens was being attacked. This weakened the city not 
only in military ability, but lead to “financial embarrassment.”173 Stuck in two expensive wars 
and without funds for either, the Athenians “imposed upon their subjects, instead of tribute, a 
tax.”174 Rather than cancel the failing Sicilian expedition, the Athenians chose to tax their 
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subjects. As “their revenues decayed”175 the Athenians experienced continuing defeat, and for 
this Thucydides does not place blame upon the Athenian generals or the soldiers. This failure, at 
this point, is the failure of the Athenian demos to govern a military campaign both tactically and 
financially. Thucydides espouses disbelief at the continuing of the failing campaign, but this 
campaign was not started with logistic and military strategy at its fore. It was always a power 
move, and the reluctance to retreat from the endeavor perhaps is the vestige of Alcibiades’ 
acknowledgment, that to lose to Sicily would admit inferiority, something the Athenians would 
rather let soldiers die than admit.  
 The expedition ends with the devastating destruction of the army and the death of Nicias. 
Nicias leads a gruesome retreat. “The dead lay unburied” as the Athenian army ran from its 
place. Each man “shuddered with grief and sorrow”176 as he passed his fallen friends. Though 
Thucydides writes that the living were to be more “pitied than those who had perished.”177 As the 
Athenians ran, friends who were ill fell and were left behind, and so “”the whole army being 
filled with tears”178 the retreat fell to disorder. Nicias surrenders to Gylippus, again serving as the 
self-sacrificing general. He tells Gylippus,  “to do what they liked with him, but to stop the 
slaughter of the soldiers.”179 Thucydides here reveals that surrender and loss are not the opposite 
of heroism, occasionally they are its definition. The intent behind all of Nicias’ speeches are 
exemplified in his death, in which he sacrifices his own life for his soldiers. During the debate, 
the greatest Athenian fear was that they would be seen as weak if they did not conquer Sicily. 
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Here, Nicias reveals that there is bravery in surrender. All the same, Nicias is “butchered”180 by 
the enemy, and for this, Thucydides places blame directly on the demos for its inability. 
Thucydides writes that,  
“this or the like was the cause of the death of a man who, of all the hellenes in my time,  
least deserved such a fate, seeing that the whole course of his life had been regulated with  
strict attention to decency, morality, and courage.”181 
 
Nicias dies ill, defeated, and far from home, which Thucydides describes as uniquely horrible 
given his character. But even so the fate of Nicias’ soldiers is equally harrowing. Thucydides 
writes of horrible exposure, how the dead were “heaped together” and how the “intolerable 
stench arose.” 182 How “seven thousand”183 Athenian soldiers died gruesomely in a strange land 
because the Athenian demos could not admit its own mortality. This was the “total destruction” 
that seemingly ended the story of Athens. And yet, the Athenians do not hold themselves 
accountable for this failure. Thucydides writes that, “they were angry with the orators who had 
joined in promoting the expedition, just as if they had not themselves voted for it.”184 Thucydides 
does certainly hold the demos accountable for the failure of the expedition, for the leadership, for 
the inability, and for the disastrous outcome.  
This reading of the Sicilian expedition, as well as the other analyses in this thesis, is 
firmly rooted in the concept that, according to Thucydides, the demos holds the greatest power in 
democracy. The Sicilian expedition was entirely the decision of a true demos. This description is 
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found even earlier in the text than book six. The first introduction of the Sicilian expedition 
comes in book two, in describing the “host of blunders”185 that lead to Athenian loss. He writes 
that the expedition failed “not so much through a miscalculation of the power of those against 
whom it was sent, as through a fault in the senders.”186 Here, he is not blaming the Athenian 
army for inability, nor is he blaming the generals who lead it, nor is he blaming Alcibiades. He is 
blaming the demos for its decision to send troops to Sicily. He continues, “they not only 
paralyzed operations in the field, but also first introduced civil discord at home.”187 This is 
perhaps the importance of the expedition. The Athenian forces did not simply lose a battle, the 
demos lost the Peloponnesian War.  
The Sicilian expedition and its impact on democracy demand analysis. As Osborne writes 
in his Athens and Athenian Democracy, this was not simply a militaristic loss. This failure 
created “not just the prospect of military defeat . . . it was the prospect that democracy was a 
failure.”188 This moment was fundamental to an understanding of Athenian democracy, because 
the Sicilian expedition was a failure, but it was the result of a fair, democratic election. This, in 
light of the faultless Athens depicted in the funeral oration, seems contrary. Athens is superior to 
other Greek states because of its superior form of government, which has lent itself to the 
building of incredible culture and military might, but its success is rooted in its political prowess. 
This was not simply the view of the Athenians, Osborne writes that other Greeks “attributed their 
success to democracy”189 as well, and it therefore follows that its failures were attributed to 
democracy as well. Indeed, “the Assembly had heard the pros and cons and the misjudgment was 
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theirs,”190 and that is the point. The Athenians don’t take ownership for their place in the 
militaristic failure of the Sicilian expedition, rather they blame the orators and oracles that lead 
them to this state. But Thucydides, and Osborne, seem to suggest that this is faulty, that the 
Athenians must take responsibility for this failure because it was they who voted for it.  
The power of democracy in this episode is its fervent emotion, although as Victoria Wohl 
would argue, that emotion is a core foundation of democracy. This concept is explored by 
Victoria Wohl in her Love among the Ruins: The Erotics of Democracy in Classical Athens. As 
Wohl describes, the Sicilian Expedition “is a matter of desire.”191 It is not a military necessity, 
but as Thucydides describes, it is a manifestation of the desires of the demos. Thucydides uses 
the language of consumptive love throughout the expedition, but particularly in the debates. As 
Wohl explains, this is a depiction of the erotic relationship between citizen and nation. The 
Athenian desire to conquer Sicily becomes “a fatal or diseased passion,”192 ruinous in an 
inevitable way. Wohl reveals that “the fundamental tenets of Athenian civic ideology are rooted 
within the psyche of the individual citizen, so that patriotism becomes narcissism.”193 Much of 
that statement rings true within the Sicilian expedition and indeed, throughout Thucydides’ text 
as a whole. A psychological frenzy consumes the Athenians in pursuit of the Sicilian expedition. 
Nicias’ speech reads nearly as an alarm to the Athenians, voicing all the logical and ethical 
problems with this expedition, yet it goes ignored. Furthermore, Nicias’ speech was uncalled for, 
it came not during a civic debate, but during a planning committee, once the expedition was 
already an agreed upon action. Nicias attempts to bring reason back into the discussion, to the 
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deaf ears of the Athenians. Wohl uses the translation “fall morbidly in love with what is 
distant”194 to describe Nicias’ condemnation of the young men’s eagerness for battle.195 The fact 
that the Athenians are willing to send vast amounts of their citizens off to fight in a war they do 
not need is indeed morbid. It is a warmongering mentality, one that is, according to Wohl, tied to 
the attractiveness of victory, creating the morbid love that consumes the demos and deafens them 
to reason.  
This is perhaps not a singular event in the history of Athens, but a fundamental 
component of democratic society. Wohl suggests that there is an “eros specific to democracy and 
the democratic subject.”196 Wohl uses the term eros to describe the deep emotional connection 
between Athenians and Athens, which has been alluded to throughout Thucydides’ text, 
harkening back to Pericles. The Funeral Oration begins this passionate ode to Athens that 
Thucydides methodically breaks down throughout the History. The concept of a beautiful city 
young men would gladly die for is a morbid sense of love, but this picture is pushed even further 
by the possibility of glory. There is a promised glory in dying for Athens, but as Thucydides 
depicted during the debate between Alcibiades and Nicias, there is a tangible promise of glory, 
of victory, that lies in Sicily. Wohl fuses the erotic desire for glory with democratic ideology to 
explain that “the tyrant is not so much the opposite of the democratic citizen as he is his logical 
extreme,”197 underscoring Alcibiades’ importance to this episode. Democracy is the rule of the 
people, and the people chose Alcibiades. They did not choose the logical, selfless Nicias, but 
rather they chose to follow their emotions, their eros, towards the dream of glory. The emotion of 
the demos, specifically, its desire in this episode, is a fundamental component of democracy, 
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because people are by nature emotional, and emotions en masse can be destructive. Wohl writes 
that the Sicilian expedition reveals the fallacy of Pericles’ Funeral Oration, because it promised a 
righteous death for all soldiers of Athens. But in Sicily, “it is a nightmare, not a democratic 
dream come true.”198 What Wohl suggests, and what Thucydides’ narrative corroborates, is that 
democracy is inherently emotional. It is necessarily fused with desire and fear because the 
human beings that comprise the demos are naturally so. This emotion, as evident in the funeral 
oration, is a fundamental component of democracy. As Pericles says of Athens to the Athenian 
people, “feed your eyes upon her from day to day, till love of her fills your heart.”199 It is a 
necessity that Athenians feel a deep emotional attachment to Athens, but that is an uncontrollable 
form of government.  
The Sicilian expedition proves that the demos had power, raw, emotional power that 
could lead Athens towards ruin. The same people worthy of the funeral oration, the people that 
made Athens glorious, were also responsible for the disastrous end in Sicily. This must be an 
argument that the people of Athens have the true power. The demos is the most powerful in 
Athens, more than any leader, orator, or oracle. The people hold the power in Athens, and must 
therefore be held accountable and responsible. This is not to say democracy is incapable of 
functioning. Rather, the History is an argument towards bettering democracy. In acknowledging 
the true power of democracy, the demos, and holding each citizen as equally accountable as their 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198	  Wohl,	  Love	  Among	  the	  Ruins:	  199.	  
199	  Thucydides,	  History,	  2.42	  
Lemisch	  50	  
Conclusion 
Democracy is a political relationship between the demos and its leaders, and this paper 
has attempted to reveal how tremulous that relationship is. Thucydides is perhaps not 
condemning democracy in its entirety, nor is he blaming the leaders of Athens for its loss against 
Sparta. Rather, perhaps the focal point of blame for Athenian defeat is the demos itself. Most 
notably because it refused to admit responsibility, as was evident through an analysis of Pericles. 
But more than this, the demos forced speakers to pander to their desire, as was evident in the 
Mytilenian debate. And certainly, the unchecked emotion of the demos contributed to its demise 
in the Sicilian expedition. These episodes reveal the true power of the demos, a power 
Thucydides seems keen to hold accountable. It is not simply the Assembly, unable to reach 
consensus in the Mytilenian debate, that loses the war. Nor is it simply the failure of the Sicilian 
expedition, though egregious it may be. There are symptoms, examples, of the deeper flaw 
Thucydides attempts to portray, and that is the demos’ unwillingness to admit its vital role in the 
political relationship of democracy. Democracy could perhaps work, as it did under Pericles, if 
the demos was willing to admit its own power, and be as selfless in its politics as it expected its 
leaders to be.  
My own personal endeavor into the project was born out of a desire to understand 
modern democracy, which during November, 2017, sounded eerily similar to 404 Athens. I 
wrote this thesis to explore democracy, honestly and critically. I think that in the people’s role in 
democracy, as relevant today as to Thucydides’ time, we can stave off of our own losses. I think 
we must hold the people as accountable as we hold our leaders, because they do, as Thucydides 
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